The challenge posed by relativistic physics is met head-on, by replacing claims about temporal variation by claims about variation across spacetime. The authors proceed to address, and defuse, a number of objections that have been marshaled against GBT, including the so-called epistemic objection according to which the theory invites skepticism about our temporal location. Importantly, neither of these axiomatizations involves commitment to properties of presentness, pastness or futurity.
) authors devise axiomatizations of GBT and its competitors which, against the backdrop of a shared quantified tense logic, significantly improves the prospects of their comparative assessment. The book offers a coherent, logically perspicuous and ideologically lean formulation of GBT, defends it against the most notorious objections to be found in the extant philosophical literature, and shows how it can be derived from a more general theory, consistent with relativistic spacetime, on the pre-relativistic assumption of an absolute and total temporal order. This monograph is a detailed study, and systematic defence, of the Growing Block Theory of time (GBT), first conceived by C.D. I flesh out each of these variants of the GB view, examine the most urgent challenges to their respective metaphysical pictures, and offer suggestions as to how these challenges can be positively addressed. Broad the Dead Past Growing Block which is currently defended by Forrest and Forbes and the Growing Events theory, which draws on some of Whitehead’s ideas on processes.
I distinguish between three variants of the growing block theory: the Fourdimensional Growing Block which goes back to C.D. In my paper I argue that getting clearer on these three questions-Q1, Q2, and Q3-will give us very different metaphysical pictures. ) is supposed to have compared to the present and what should be taken to be the fundamental constituents of the spatio-temporal reality. These two theses support a picture of the universe as growing, gaining in more and more things and events, as these recede into the past but the two theses do not specify how the growth of the block is to be understood what status the past (. Growing Block theorists are committed, roughly, to two theses: that past and present events exist and that future events do not, and that the present is dynamic and constantly changing. We consider the implications of these findings for several debates in the philosophy of time. We found evidence in support of the first two claims. Second, that people, perhaps tacitly, believe that the fact that the future is alethically open is a reason to endorse the growing block theory and third, that part of what explains why people tend to naively represent our world as a growing block is that they represent the future as alethically open. First, that people's intuitive or pre-reflective sense that the future is open is at least partly captured by there being truth-gaps for future contingents: what we call alethic openness.
) In this paper, we empirically investigate three claims. This is partly motivated by the idea that we find it intuitive that, in some sense, the future is open and the past closed, and that the growing block theory is particularly well suited to accommodate this being so. Whatever its ultimate philosophical merits, it is often thought that the growing block theory presents an intuitive picture of reality that accords well with our pre-reflective or folk view of time, and of the past, present, and future. On the other hand, versions of the new growing block theory that embrace disunified strategies are better able to differentiate themselves from presentism, but are unattractive because of their disunity. The more unified a strategy is for responding to the epistemic objection, the more that strategy results in the new growing block model positing truthmakers that are similar to those posited by the presentist, which erodes the purported advantage of the growing block theory over presentism. In this paper it is argued that the new growing block theorist faces a dilemma. They have done so in an attempt to defuse a particular epistemic objection to their view. ) same kind of thing as what makes true, present-tensed propositions. Recently, new growing block theorists have suggested that what makes true, past-tensed propositions, is not the (. This put the growing block theory ahead of its principal dynamist rival: presentism. It was once held to be a virtue of the growing block theory that it combines temporal dynamism with a straightforward account of in virtue of what past-tensed propositions are true, and an explanation for why some future-tensed propositions are not true (assuming they are not).
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